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Maskin mechanism 
 
A social choice rule (SCR) maps preferences into optimal allocations. A SCR is 
monotonic if whenever chooses allocation A it keeps the same choice when A is equally 
or more preferred in the ranking of all agents. An SCR satisfies no veto power if it 
chooses A when A is top ranking for, at least, all agents minus one. 
 
A mechanism is a message space and a function mapping messages into 
allocations. A mechanism implements an SCR in Nash Equilibrium (NE) if for any 
preference profile optimal allocations coincide with those yielded by NE. 
 
Maskin conjectured that, with more than two agents, any SCR satisfying 
monotonicity and no veto power was implementable in NE. He constructed a 'universal 
mechanism' to do the job. This is the Maskin mechanism.  Even though the spirit was 
correct, the original proof was not. Repullo, Saijo, Williams and McKelvey offered 
correct proofs. 
 
In the Maskin mechanism each agent announces the preferences of all agents, an 
allocation and an integer. There are three possibilities. The first is complete agreement: 
all agents announce the same preferences and allocation and this allocation is optimal 
for the announced preferences. The allocation is the one announced by everybody. 
 
The second possibility is a single dissident: a single agent whose announcement 
differs from the others. The allocation cannot improve the dissident's payoff if her 
preferences were announced by others. The third possibility is several dissidents: 
several agents whose messages differ. The allocation is announced by the agent whose 
message is the highest integer. 
 
The interpretation of the mechanism is that the dissident must prove that she is 
not manipulating the mechanism in her favour, but pointing out a plot of the other 
agents to fool the mechanism. With several dissidents, the 'law of the jungle' holds. 
 
This mechanism has been critized because the strategy space is not bounded (if 
bounded, there might be NE yielding suboptimal allocations) and because, with several 
dissidents, allocations are dictatorial (if agents renegotiated these allocations, there 
might be NE yielding suboptimal allocations).  
 
Experiments run with this mechanism suggest that both criticisms are far from 
the mark. The true problem is that to become a single dissident might be profitable and 
never hurts. If this deviation is penalized, the frequency of suboptimal NE is about 18 
per cent. 
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